基于政府间府际关系的畜禽养殖废弃物治理政策优化——以治理中小规模养殖场户畜禽粪污污染为例

Policy Optimization of Livestock and Poultry Waste Treatment Based on Intergovernmental Relations—Taking the Treatment of Livestock and Poultry Manure Pollution in Small and Medium-Sized Farms as an Example

中文关键词:  畜禽养殖废弃物治理  府际关系  政策优化

英文关键词:livestock and poultry waste treatment  intergovernmental relations  policy optimization

中文摘要:

      本文从央地纵向关系、部门间横向关系、环保督察斜线关系等视角出发，探讨畜禽养殖废弃物治理政策背后的府际关系博弈逻辑和利益融合路径，实证探讨治理案例。结果表明，政府府际间存在利益博弈，但可以实现利益融合和治理有效。其中，经济、社会和生态利益的排序差异、治理事务权与财权不匹配、地方考核指标偏向经济等因素造成央地间利益诉求差异，可从增加融资渠道、优化考核方式、扩大监管渠道和多元共治等方面促进利益融合；双重管理体制、全局和局部利益并存等因素造成同一层级的不同政府部门间存在利益诉求差异，但环保督察等“运动式”治理、约束性生态指标被纳入官员考核体系等措施有助于其组成政绩共荣体；结合案例实证检验，提出中央政府需要通过严格制度安排和多重监管督察治理动态、整合地方政策资源帮助政府各部门间形成政绩共荣体、疏堵并举精准施策构建紧密利益联结机制、搭建“政府—市场—公众”多元共治治理格局等政策建议。

英文摘要:

      Clarifying the relationship between policy makers and policy implementers and their interest game is the key to reveal the failure of livestock and poultry waste treatment policy. From the perspective of the vertical relationship between the central and local governments, the horizontal relationship between departments and the oblique line relationship of environmental protection supervisors, this paper discusses the game logic of intergovernmental relations and the path of interest fusion behind the livestock and poultry waste treatment policy, and empirically discusses the governance cases. The results show that there is interest game between governments, but it can realize interest fusion and effective governance. Among them, the difference in interest statement between central and local governments is caused by the difference in the ranking of economic, social and ecological interests, the mismatching of governance affairs and financial rights, and the bias of local assessment indicators towards economy, which can promote the integration of interests from the aspects of increasing financing channels, optimizing assessment methods, expanding regulatory channels and multi governance; The dual management system, the coexistence of overall and local interests and other factors result in different interest statements among different government departments at the same level. However, measures such as campaign-style governance such as environmental protection supervision and binding ecological indicators being incorporated into the official assessment system help them form a political performance coprosperity body; Combined with the empirical test of cases, it is proposed that the central government needs to help various government departments form a body of common prosperity through strict institutional arrangements, multiple supervision of governance dynamics, and integration of local policy resources. It is also suggested that the central government should take precise measures to build a close interest connection mechanism, and build a “government market public” multi governance pattern.