城市生活垃圾分类强制实施背景下“一主多元”治理模式的主体策略演化分析

Evolution of Participants' Strategy on “One-Main-Multi-Element” Governance Mode of Municipal Household Waste Classification under Compulsory Implementation

中文关键词:  城市生活垃圾分类  强制实施政策背景  “一主多元”治理模式  主体策略  演化博弈模型

英文关键词:municipal household waste classification  compulsory implementation policy background  "one-main-multi-element" governance model  participants' strategy  evolutionary game model

中文摘要:

      随着经济不断发展和人民消费水平提升，垃圾分类治理问题日益严峻。实践经验表明，强制实施背景下政府主导与承包商、公众和环保组织为核心的多元主体共同参与的“一主多元”协作模式，对于我国垃圾分类治理具有较好适用性。但该模式也存在“一主”突出、“多元”不足及其他系统性冲突。为明确多元主体参与策略对“一主多元”治理模式稳定性的影响，首先，本文分析了城市生活垃圾分类强制实施背景下该模式运行机制及主体动因。然后，构建以承包商、公众和环保组织为主体的三方演化博弈系统，对不同策略组合下系统的演化结果进行演绎。最后，借助数值仿真分析了参与成本、环境收益和政府补贴对主体策略选择及系统稳定性的影响。结果表明：环保组织参与垃圾分类治理的积极性最高，公众最低；对于系统运行风险，承包商属于风险偏好者，环保组织属于风险回避者，公众属于风险中立者；承包商对参与成本最敏感，对政府补贴最不敏感，公众则正好与之相反；环境收益的提升有助于提高多元主体的参与积极性。这些发现对于如何提升多元主体参与垃圾分类治理的积极性及“一主多元”治理模式的运行效能具有启示意义。

英文摘要:

      With the continuous development of the economy and the improvement of people's consumption, the problem of waste classification is becoming increasingly severe. The practice indicates that under the policy background of compulsory implementation, the "one-main-multi-element" governance mode, jointly participated by contractors, the general public, and environmental protection organizations, and led by the government, has better applicability for waste classification in China. However, this model has "one-main" prominent, "multi-element" insufficient, and other systematic conflicts. To reveal the impact of the participants' strategy on the stability of the "one-main-multi-element" governance mode, firstly, this paper analyzes the operation mechanism of the mode and the participants' motivation under the policy background of compulsory implementation of municipal household waste classification. Secondly, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game system with contractors, the general public, and environmental protection organizations as the main body to deduce the evolution results of the system under different strategy combinations. Finally, we analyze the effects of participation costs, environmental benefits, and government subsidies on the participants' strategies and the system's stability by numerical simulation. The results show that environmental protection organizations have the highest enthusiasm to participate in waste classification, while the public has the lowest enthusiasm. For the risks, contractors are risk seekers, environmental protection organizations are risk averter, and the general public is risk neutral. Contractors are most sensitive to participation costs and least sensitive to government subsidies, while the general public is just the opposite. Promoting environmental benefits will help improve the participation enthusiasm of multiple subjects. These findings have enlightenment significance in improving the participants' enthusiasm for municipal household waste classification and the operational efficiency of the "one-main-multi-element" governance mode.