畜禽粪污集中处理模式中的三方演化博弈研究——基于规模差异与政府干预视角

Study on the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in the Centralized Livestock Manure Treatment Model—Based on Scale Difference and Government Intervention Perspective

中文关键词:  规模差异  政府干预  畜禽粪污  集中处理模式  演化博弈

英文关键词:scale difference  government intervention  livestock and poultry manure  centralized treatment mode  evolutionary game

中文摘要:

      作为环境污染治理的新举措，畜禽粪污集中处理中心虽然在高效处理粪污、提高资源利用质量、改善农村环境等方面发挥了显著作用，但是，其在运营中依然存在各种各样的问题，如设备利用率低下、粪污未能得到有效收集、骗取补贴等。为了探讨上述运营困境的形成机理，本文从养殖规模差异化与政府干预视角出发，构建政府、养殖户与处理中心三方共同参与的演化博弈模型，并在不同情境下探讨三方策略选择的影响因素与演化路径。研究表明，当小规模养殖户占比较高时，处理中心会选择“投机”策略加以获利，反之，在粪污处理需求大的规模养殖地区，处理中心则倾向于“不投机”的稳定经营策略；虽然政府补贴对于养殖户选择“参与”策略具有促进作用，但是，对于小规模养殖户而言，仍有一定的概率选择“不参与”策略；政府需要综合考虑处理中心的预期收益、受奖惩力度等因素制定合理补贴范畴，若补贴过高且缺乏相应的监管机制，处理中心会为了谋求更多利益而采取“投机”策略；当处理中心投机行为较频繁时，政府需加大监管并提高惩罚力度，以维护畜禽粪污集中处理模式正常运作。

英文摘要:

      As a new initiative for environmental pollution control, though centralized livestock and poultry manure treatment centers play a significant role in efficiently treating manure, improving the quality of resource utilization, and ameliorating the rural environment, there are still various problems in their operation, such as low utilization rate of equipment, ineffective collection of manure, and fraudulent subsidies. In order to explore the mechanism of the above operational dilemmas, this article innovatively constructs an evolutionary game model involving the government, farmers and treatment centers from the perspective of farming scale differentiation and government intervention, and discusses the influencing factors and evolutionary paths of the strategic choices of the three parties under different situations. The study shows that when the proportion of small-scale farmers is relatively high, treatment centers will choose “speculative” strategies to make profits, while on the contrary, in large-scale farming areas with high demand for manure treatment, treatment centers tend to choose a stable operation which is “non-speculative”; although government subsidies have a catalytic effect on farmers’ choice of “participation” strategy, there is still a certain probability for small-scale farmers to choose “nonparticipation” strategy; the government needs to consider the expected revenue of treatment centers, the strength of incentives and penalties, and other factors to formulate reasonable subsidies. If the subsidies are too high and there is no corresponding supervision mechanism, the treatment center will adopt the strategy of “speculation” in order to seek more benefits; when the treatment center’s speculation is more frequent, the government needs to increase supervision and improve the punishment to maintain the normal operation of the centralized livestock and poultry waste treatment model.